SECTION X.
The Judgment of several eminent Persons, who flourished in England, antecedently to the Reformation.
From among the ancient worthies, natives of our own land, and remarkable for having been led into an acquaintance with the distinguishing doctrines of the gospel; Bede, Grosthead, Wickliffe, Bradwardin, and Lord Cobham, may be selected, as none of the least conspicuous. If our island be disgraced with having given birth to Pelagius, she is also honoured with having been the mother of such sons as have cut up Pelagianism both root and branch.
1. Beda, or Bede, whom all succeeding ages have concurred to surname The Venerable, was born A.D. 672, or 673, in the county of Durham, somewhere near the mouth of the Tine.1 Dr. Fuller styles him "the profoundest scholar in that age, for Latin, Greek, Philosophy, History, Divinity, and Mathematics:" and adds, that "homilies of his making were read, during; his life-time, in the Christian Churches: a dignity afforded to him alone."2 He died A. D. 734.3 An incident, which occurred in his last moments, is of so singular a nature, that I cannot help giving it to the reader. "One of the last things he did, was the translating of St. John's gospel into English. When death seized on him, one of his devout scholars, whom he used for his secretary or amanuensis, complained, My beloved master, there remains yet one sentence unwritten. - "Write it then quickly," replied Bede: and summoning all his spirits together (like the last blaze of a candle going out) he indited it, and expired." Thus, adds the historian, "God's children are immortal, while their Father hath any thing for them to do on earth: and death, that beast, cannot overcome and kill them, till they have first finished their testimony, Rev, ii. 7. which done, like silk-worms, they willingly die, when their web is ended, and are comfortably entombed in their own endeavours."4
I should offer an insult even to the most unknowing reader, were I to observe, that the very name of Arminius was unheard of for many centuries after this early period. But if Arminius himself was unborn, the doctrines of which that Dutch schismatic was the reviver and the varnisher, had, about the beginning of the fifth century, been broached by Pelagius, who was the Arminius of that age. With what horror and detestation our learned and pious Anglo-Saxon reviewed that heretic and his heresies, appears from what he says of both, in the course of his ecclesiastical History of the English Nation.5 He goes even so far, as to style the free-will system, "The Pelagian plague."6
Archbishop Usher, in his History of the Predestinarian Controversy, already referred to so often, cites some of Pelagius's propositions, together with Beda's refutations of them, in the very words of each writer. The following extract will enable the reader to form an exact judgment of Beda's Calvinism.
"Whereas Pelagius says, that we are not impelled to evil by the corruption of our nature, seeing we do neither good nor evil without the compliance of our own will; he herein contradicts the apostle, who affirms, "I know, that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing." Rom. vii - Moreover, when Pelagius asserts that "we are at liberty to do one thing always" [i.e. to do always what is good, if it be not our own faults,] "seeing we are always able to do both one and the other," [i.e. in Pelagius's opinion, free-will has a power of indifference to good or evil; to either of which it sovereignly inclines, according to its own independent determination: to this Beda replies] "He herein contradicts the prophet, who humbly addressing himself to God, saith, I know, O Lord, that a man's way is not his own; it is not in man that walketh to direct his own steps: Jer. x. 23. Nay, Pelagius maketh himself greater than the apostle, who said, "With my mind I myself serve the law of God, but with my flesh the law of sin." Rom. vii. 25.7
On one hand, Pelagius had affirmed, "That, in the expulsion of Adam from Paradise, and in the assumption of Enoch into heaven, God himself had given a demonstration of man's free-will: since Adam would not have merited Punishment at the hand of a just God, nor would Enoch have deserved to be elected, unless each of them had it in his power to act the reverse of what they did. In the very same manner, adds Pelagius, we must judge concerning the two brothers, Cain and Abel; and concerning the twins, Esau and Jacob." To this Beda opposes the following simple, strong, scriptural answer: "Pelagius here runs counter to the apostle, whose decision is, the children being not yet born, neither having done good nor evil, that the purpose of God, according to election, might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said, The elder shall serve the younger: as it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated." Rom. ix. 11-13.8
Pelagius had asserted, that "The just God could never command us to do any thing impossible; nor can the merciful God condemn a man for doing what he could not avoid." Beda replies, "The former proposition is true, if spoken with reference to that succour which we derive from him, to whom the universal Church thus prays, Lead thou me forth in the path of thy commandments. Psalm cxix. 35. But, if a man trust to his own powers, he is refuted by that most true saying of Christ, Without me can ye can do nothing. John xv. 5. And whereas Pelagius declares, that he who is gracious will not condemn a man for doing what he could not avoid; he, in this, flatly opposes the assertion of the same gracious Redeemer and just Judge who avers, that, except a man, even infants themselves included, be born again, of water and the Spirit, he cannot see the kingdom of God." John iii. 5.9
II. Robert Grosthead, born at Stradbrook, in Suffolk, was made bishop of Lincoln, A.D. 123510 Mr. Camden terms him, "a much better scholar and linguist than could be expected from the age he lived in: an awful reprover of the Pope, a monitor to the king, a lover of truth, a corrector of prelates, an instructor of the clergy, a maintainer of scholars, a preacher to the people, a diligent searcher of the Scripture, and a mallet to the Romanists."11
This great luminary was translated to Heaven, October 1, 1253. Few ecclesiastics make so bright a figure in the annals of their country. "He was," saoys Rapin, "a prelate of resolution and courage, neither to be gained by court-favours, nor to be frightened by the Pope's menaces. Wholly intent on following what appeared to him reasonable and just, he little regarded the circumstances of the times, or the quality of persons; but equally opposed the king's will, and the pope's pleasure, according as it happened. He could not see, without indignation and concern, the best preferments in the kingdom bestowed on Italians, who neither resided on their benefices, not, understood English. Refusing to institute an Italian to one of the best livings of his diocese, he was presently after suspended: but, regardless of the censure, he continued his episcopal functions. He even refused, at that very time, to admit of new provisions from the Pope in favour of other Italians, declaring, that to entrust the cure of souls to such pastors was to act in the name of the devil, rather than by the authority of God. Soon after, Grosthead touched the Pope in a very sensible part, by computing the yearly12 sums drawn by the beneficed Italians out of England. Innocent IV., who then sat in the papal chair, sent him a menacing letter, which would have frightened any but him. Grosthead returned a very bold answer, which put Innocent into a terrible rage. What! said the Pope, has this old dotard the confidence to censure my conduct? By St. Peter and St. Paul, I will make such an example that the world shall stand amazed at his punishment. For is not his sovereign, the king of England, our vassal? Nay, is he riot our slave? It is but, therefore, signifying our pleasure to the English Court, and this antiquated prelate will be immediately imprisoned, and put to what further disgrace we shall think fit. The annals of Lannercost inform us, that the bishop was excommunicated, a little before his death: but he, without regarding the censure, appealed to the court of heaven. Several historians add, that Innocent moved, in the conclave, to have the body of Grosthead taken up and buried in the highway: but to this the cardinals would not consent. Be this as it will, if he was excommunicated, he paid no attention to it, but continued to discharge his functions. Neither were the clergy of his diocese more scrupulous than their bishop: for they obeyed him until the day of his death."13
It was not without much imaginary reason, that the Pope was so violently exasperated against Grosthead: who might well stand, in his Holiness's books, for a rebel and a heretic.14 Of his rebellions, some account has been now given. Of his heresy take the following passage for a sample:
"Grace is that good pleasure of God, whereby he willeth to give us what we have not deserved, in order to our benefit, not to his. It is manifest, therefore, that all the good which is within us, whether it be natural, or freely conferred afterwards, proceeds from the grace of God: for there is no good thing of which his will is not the author; and what he wills is done. He himself averts our will from evil, and converts our will to good, and makes our will to persevere in that good. - A will to good, whereby man becomes conformed to the will of God, is a grace freely given: for the divine will is grace. And grace is then said to be infused, when the divine will begins to operate on our will."15
The humility of this great and good man is evident from what he says in one of his Epistles, written while he was arch-deacon of Leicester. "Nothing that occurs in your letters ought to give me more pain than your styling me, a person invested with authority, and endued with brightness of knowledge. So far am I from being of your opinion, that I feel myself unfit even to be a disciple to a man of authority: and perceive myself enveloped with the darkness of ignorance, as to innumerable matters which are objects of knowledge. But, did I in reality possess any of those high qualities which You ascribe to me, he alone would be worthy of the praise, and it would all be referrible to him unto whom we daily say, Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but to thy name give the glory."16 The same spirit of modesty and self abasement accompanied him to the Episcopal chair. Hence he usually styled himself, in his subsequent Letters, Robertus, permissione Divine, Lincolniensis Ecclesiae Minister humilis; "Robert, by Divine permission, the poor Minister of the Church of Lincoln."17
I acknowledge, that, on the subjects of grace and free-will, Grosthead does not always preserve an invariable consistency. The wonder, however, ought to be, not that he saw no better, but that he saw so well as he did. Like Apollos, he was, as to the main, eloquent, mighty in the scriptures, fervent in spirit, speaking and teaching boldly the things of the Lord: though, like the same excellent Alexandrian, he sometimes needed an Aquila and Priscilla to expound to him the way of God more perfectly.18
III. John de Wickliff, surnamed The evangelical Doctor, enlightened and adorned the succeeding century. He was born in the parish of Wickliff, near Richmond, in Yorkshire, about A. D. 1324. The historical particulars, relative to the life of this extraordinary man, are so interesting and numerous, that I forbear to enter on them lest they lead me too far.
Mr. Guthrie, in his History of England, observes, that Wickliff "seems to have been a strong predestinarian."19 It will presently appear, that he more than seemed to have been such; and that Luther and Calvin themselves were not stronger predestinarians than Wickliff. I shall open the evidence, with two propositions, extracted from his own writings:
1. " The prayer of the reprobate prevaileth for no man.
2. "All things that happen, do come absolutely of necessity."20
The manner, in which this great harbinger of the reformation defended the latter proposition, plainly shews him to have been (notwithstanding Guthrie's insinuation to the contrary)a deep and skilful disputant. "Our Lord," says he, "affirmed that such or such an event should come to pass. Its accomplishment, therefore, was unavoidable. The antecedent is infallible: by parity of argument, the consequent is so too. For the consequent is not in the power of a created being, forasmuch as Christ affirmed so many things" [before they were brought to pass.] "Neither did Christ [pre-] affirm any thing accidentally. Seeing, then, that his affirmation was not accidential, but necessary; it follows, that the event affirmed by him must be necessary likewise. This argument," adds Wickliff "receives additional strength, by observing, that, in what way soever God may declare his will by his after-discoveries of it in time; still, his determination, concerning the event, took place before the world was made: ergo, the event will surely follow. The necessity, therefore, of the antecedent, holds no less irrefragably for the necessity of the consequent. And who can either promote or hinder the inference, viz. That this was decreed of God before the foundation of the world?"21 I will not undertake to justify the whole of this paragraph. I can only meet the excellent man half-way. I agree with him, as to the necessity of events: but I cannot, as he evidently did, suppose God himself to be a necessary agent, in the utmost sense of the term. That God acts in the most exact conformity to his own decrees, is a truth which scripture asserts again and again: but that God was absolutely free in decreeing, is no less asserted by the inspired writers; who, with one voice, declare the Father's predestination, and subsequent disposal, of all things, to be entirely founded, not on any antecedent necessity, but on the single sovereign pleasure of his own will.
The quotation, however, proves, that Wickliff was an absolute Necessitarian. And he improves, with great solidity and acuteness, the topic of prophecy into (what it most certainly is) a very strong argument for predestination. As the prophecies of the Old and New Testaments are such an evidence of the divine inspiration of the sacred writers, and such a proof of Christianity, as all the infidels in the world will never be able to overthrow; so, on the other hand, those same prophecies conclude, to the full, as strongly in favour cf peremptory predestination. For, if events were undecreed, they would be unforeknown: and if unforeknown, they could not he infallibly22 predicted. To say, that 'events may he foreknown, without falling under any effective or permissive decree;' would be saying either nothing to the purpose, or worse than nothing. For, if God can, with certainty, foreknow any event whatever, which he did not previously determine to accomplish or permit; and that event, barely foreknown but entirely undecreed, be so certainly future, as to furnish positive ground for unerring prophecy; it would follow, 1. That God is dependent, for his knowledge, on the things known; instead of all things being dependent on him: and, 2. That there is some extraneous concatenation of causes, prior to the will and knowledge of God, by which his will is regulated, and on which his knowledge is founded. Thus Arminianism, in flying from the decree, jumps over head and ears into the most dangerous and exceptional part of that very stoicism which she pretends to execrate and avoid.
I return, now, to doctor Wickliff, whose strictures led me into this digression.
What he little more than intimates, in the citation given above; he delivered, it seems, more plainly and peremptorily, elsewhere. Among the 62 articles, laid to his charge by Thomas Netter (commonly called, Thomas of Walden, who flourished about the year 1409,) and for which that writer refers to the volume and chapter of Wickliff's works; are these three :
That "all things come to pass by fatal necessity:
That "God could not make the world otherwise than it is made: and,
That "God cannot do any thing, which he doth not do."23
This is fatalism with a witness. And I cite these prepositions, not to depreciate Dr. Wickliff, whose character I admire and revere, as one of the greatest and best since the apostolic age; nor yet with a view to recommend the propositions themselves: but, simply, to shew, how far this illustrious reformer ran from the present Arminian system, or rather no-system, of chance and free-will. But, concerning even those of Wickliff's assertions, which were the most rash and unguarded; candour (not to say, justice) obliges me to observe, with Fuller, that, were all his works extant, "we might therein read the occasion, intention, and connexion, of what he spake: together with the limitations, restrictions, distinctions and qualifications, of what he maintained. There we might see, what was the overplus of his passion, and what the just measure of his judgment. Many phrases, heretical in sound, would appear orthodox in sense. Yea, some of his [reputedly-] poisonous passages, dressed with due caution, would prove not only wholesome, but cordial truths: many of his expressions wanting, not granum ponderis, but granum salis; no weight of truth, but some grains of discretion."24
What I shall next add, maybe rather styled bold truths, than indiscreet assertions. He defined the Church to consist only of persons predestinated. And affirmed, that God loved David and Peter as dearly when they grievously sinned, as he doth now when they are possessed of glory.25 This latter position might, possibly, have been more unexceptionably expressed; be it, substantially, ever so true.
Wickliff was sound in the article of gratuits paroudon and justification by the alone death and righteousness of Jesus Christ. "The merit of Christ," says he, "is, of itself, sufficient to redeem every man from Hell. It is to he understood of a sufficiency of itself, without any other concurring cause. All that follow Christ, being justified by his righteousness, shall he saved, as his offspring."26 It has been already observed, and proved, that he had very high notions of that inevitable necessity, by which he supposed every event is governed. Yet, he did not enthusiastically sever the end from the means. Witness his own words: "Though all future things do happen necessarily, yet God wills that good things happen to his servants through the efficacy, of prayer."27 Upon the whole, it is no wonder that such a profligate factor for Popery and Arminianism, as Peter Heylin, should (pro more,) indecently affirm, that "Wickliff's field had more tares than wheat; and his books more heterodoxes than sound Catholic doctrine."28
His character, as briefly drawn by bishop Newton, and a word or two from Mr. Rolt, shall conclude his article. Bishop Newton terms him, "the deservedly famous John Wickliff, the honour of his own, and the admiration of all succeeding, times. Rector only of Lutterworth [in Leicestershire] he filled all England, and almost all Europe, with his doctrine. He began to grow famous, about the year 1360. He29 translated the canonical scriptures into the English language and wrote comments upon them. He demonstrated the antichristianity of Popery, and the abomination of desolation in the temple of God. - His success was greater than he could have expected. The princes, the people, the university of Oxford, many even of the clergy, favoured and supported him, and embraced his opinions. - This truly great and good man died of a [second stroke of the] palsy, the last day of the year 1387. But his doctrines did not die with him. His books were read in the public schools and colleges at Oxford, and were recommended to the diligent perusal of each student in the University, till they were condemned and prohibited, by the council of Constance, in the next century. He himself had been permitted to die in peace; but after his death, his doctrines were condemned [again,] his books were burnt, his very body was dug up and burnt too, by a decree of the council of Constance, and the command of Pope Martin V. executed by Richard Fleming, bishop of Lincoln. His followers, however, were not discouraged; and many of them witnessed a good confession even unto death."30
"I am informed," says Mr. Rolt,31 "by a gentleman, who lives near Lutterworth, that the gown, which Dr. Wickliff wore, now covers the communion table in that Church.32 And, as this eminent man may justly be considered as the author of the Reformation, not only in England, but throughout all Europe; surely, some decent respect should be paid to his worth, and a public monument erected to his memory. The Wickliffites were oppressed, but could not be extinguished. Persecution served only to establish that faith which became general at the Reformation, about a hundred years after these restraints were moderated. The whole nation then unanimously embraced the doctrine which Wickliff began; and Popery was abolished in England, that the purity of religion might increase the blessings of liberty." Let me just add; surely Arminianism must blush to call herself Protestant, when he, whom all unite to consider as (under God) the "author of the Reformation, not in England only, but in all Europe," was not merely a Calvinist, but more than a Calvinist; and carried the doctrine of predestination to such an extreme height, as even Luther, Calvin, and Zanchius, did not fully come up to. Mr. Hume is sufficiently moderate, and not at all above par, in affirming Wickliff to have "asserted, that every thing was subject to fate and destiny, and that all men are predestinated either to eternal salvation or reprobation."33
IV. Thomas Bradwardin, personal chaplain to king Edward III. and at last archbishop of Canterbury, may rank with the brightest luminaries, of whom this or any other nation can boast. Mr. Camden observes, that Bradwardin Castle, in Herefordshire, "gave both original and name" to this famous archbishop; "who for his great variety of knowledge, and his admirable proficiency in the most abstruse parts of learning, was honoured with the title of Dr. Profundus,"34 or the profound doctor. That his ancestors had been seated in that part of Herefordshire mentioned above, is admitted by the general stream of writers, who have treated of this great man. But he himself was certainly born in Sussex. Sir Henry Savile seems to have had very sufficient reason for determining our prelate's birth-place to the city of Chichester.35 The year that gave him to the world, was probably 1290, about the middle of the reign of Edward I. During the reign of Edward II. he was admitted into Merton College, Oxford: and was proctor of the University, A. D. 1325. He made himself perfect master of the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato. But his chief talent lay in Mathematics and Theology: to these he devoted his main application, and in these he distanced the brightest of his contemporaries. Sir Henry Savile had in his possession a large manuscript volume of astronomical tables, composed by this extraordinary man; on which that most learned writer sat a very high value, and of which he speaks in very respectable terms.
If Sir Henry admired Bradwardin as a philosopher; he revered and was in raptures with him as a divine. "It was in divinity," says he, "that the archbishop snatched the prize from all his coevals. That single volume [De Causa Dei,] of which I am the editor, written to unravel and expose the falsehood of Pelagianism, is alone sufficient to crown him with the most consummate theologist of that century. We have the sad, but resistless conviction of experience, that the Pelagian heresy has been a growing evil, for ages back. To this, therefore, our accomplished author opposed his artillery. Some lectures, which he had formerly delivered at Oxford, were the basis of this most noble performance. At the earnest entreaty of the Merton students, to whom those lectures had been read, he arranged, polished, enlarged, and reduced them into form, while he was Chancellor of the diocese of London. No sooner was the work completed and given to the public, than vast multitudes of hands were employed in transcribing it, and copies of it were diffused throughout the greatest part of Europe. No treatise could be more eagerly sought and received. Hardly a library was without it. It captivated the very muses; for Chaucer the father of English poetry, who flourished within a few years after the archbishop's decease, puts hint in the same rank: with St. Austin, in these lines, so pleasingly remarkable for their antique simplicity of style:
"But what that God afore wrote, must
needs bee,
After the opinion of certain clerkis
Witnesse of him
that
anyclerke is,
That in schole is great altercation
In this
matter, and
great disputation,
And hath been of an hundred thousand
men.
But I ne
cannot boult it to the bren,
As can the holy doctour Saincte
Austin,
Or
Boece, or the bishop of Bradwardin."36
Our excellent prelate, being a most exact mathematician, has, conformably to the rules of the science he so much admired, thrown his theological arguments into mathematical order: and, I believe, was the first divine who pursued that method. Hence, his book against the Pelagians is, from the beginning to end, one regular, strong unbroken chain. This does, indeed, render his work abstruse and difficult, in some measure, to such as peruse it superficially: but, at the same time, it conduces to make his reasonings intrinsically firm, conclusive, and invincible."37
Having, for some years, sat as Divinity Professor, at Oxford, with the most exalted reputation; he was admitted to the friendship of Richard de Bury, the learned bishop of Durham: and, at length, went to live with him as one of his family. Seven other persons (mostly Merton men) conspicuous for genius and learning, were also transplanted, from Oxford, to the house of that munificent prelate, who had a very high relish for the pleasures and improvements resulting from literary conversation."38
Such was the modesty of Bradwardin, that his preferments flowed in upon him, not only unsought, but undesired. It was with great difficulty, that he was prevailed upon to let a canonry of Lincoln be annexed to his chancellorship of London, though the revenue of the latter was far from large. At length, his vast learning, and the invariable purity of his life, rendered him so famous, that he was nominated by John Stratford, then archbishop of Canterhury, to be chaplain to his sovereign, King Edward III. In this capacity, he attended that great Prince, during his long and successful wars in France. With a warpless integrity, rarely found in those who wait on kings, he made it his business to calm and mitigate the fierceness of his master's temper, when he saw him either immoderately fired with warlike rage, or unduly flushed with the advantages of victory. Nor were his piety and watchfulness limited to his monarch. He often preached to the army with such meekness and persuasiveness of wisdom, as restrained them from many of those savage violences, which are too frequently the attendants on military success.
On the death of Stratford; the church of Canterbury unanimously chose Bradwardin for their archbishop. But the king being still engaged in France, refused to part with him. John Ufford was then put in nomination for that see: but he dying soon after his election, Bradwardin was chosen a second time, and the king yielded to the choice. He was, accordingly, consecrated at39 Avignon, in 1349, and returned into England soon after. But he did not long adorn the metropolitical chair. He died, at Lambeth, the October following;40 and was interred in St. Anselm's chapel, by the south wall, within the cathedral of Canterbury: disgraced with a most wretched41 Epitaph, which is only worthy of preservation for its having once marked the tomb of so great a man.
I have dwelled the longer on the outlines of Bradwardin's History, because I find them so superficially hurried over by the generality of our English writers. A species of negligence, not easily excusable, where a character, so peculiarly illustrious, was the object of investigation.
The Protestant cause is more indebted to this extraordinary prelate, than seems to be commonly known. He was, in same sense, Dr. Wickliff's spiritual father: for it was the perusal of Bradwardin's writings, which, next to the Holy Scriptures, opened that proto-reformer's eyes to discover the genuine doctrine of faith and justification. "Bradwardin taught him" [i.e. taught Wickliff] the nature of a true and justifying faith, in opposition to merit-mongers and pardoners, purgatory and pilgrimages."42
I now beg my reader's permission to lay before him a few passages from Bradwardin's golden work, entitled, "The Cause of God:" written as an antidote against the Pelagian poison, and to demonstrate the absoluteness both of providence and grace. This inestimable performance was printed, A. D. 1618, by the united care (and, it should seem, at the joint-expense) of the pious Dr. George Abbot, archbishop of Canterbury, and the most learned Sir Henry Savile.
Bradwardin laments the Pelagianism of his own times, in terms but too applicable to the present: "What multitudes, O Lord, at this day, join hands with Pelagius, in contending for free-will, and in fighting against thy absolutely-free grace; and against that great spiritual champion for grace, the Apostle Paul! By how many is thy unmerited grace looked upon with scornful abhorrence, while they proudly insist, that free-will alone is sufficient to salvation! or, if they make use of the word grace, and slightly pretend to believe that grace is necessary; to what purpose is this pretence, while they boast of its being in the power of free-will to lay thy grace under obligation? thus making grace itself no longer gratuitous, but representing thee as selling it, instead of giving it.43
"Some, more haughty than even Lucifer, are not content with barely lifting themselves to an equality with thee; but are most daringly desirous to govern and control thee, who art the King of kings. Such are they, who dread not to affirm, that, even in a common action, their own will walks first, as an independent mistress; and that thy will follows after, like an obsequious handmaid: that they themselves go foremost, like sovereign lords ; while thou walkest behind them, like a hired servant: that they issue their orders, as kings; and that thou like an implicit subject, actest according to the imperial nod of their determining will."44 By such nervous reasoning, and by such well adapted images, did this christian hero cut in sunder the very sinews of what was then termed antecedent merit; but which is now suppled into the smoother phrase of, "conditional grace:" the same thing in sense, though of softer sound.
Among the first positions, which Bradwardin undertakes to prove, are these: that "God is, not contingently, but necessarily, perfect. That he is incapable of changing. That he is not (for instance) irascible and appeasable; liable to the emotions of joy and sorrow; or, in any respect, passive. Since, if he were, he would be changeable: whereas he is always the same, and never varies. He cannot change for the better, because" says Bradwardin, "he is already perfectly good [and happy.] Neither can he change for the worse, because he is necessarily perfect, and therefore cannot cease to be so."45
He justly observes, that "the divine will is universaliter efficax, universally efficacious: which is a mark of much higher perfection, than if his will could be hindered, frustrated, or miss of its intent. If God could wish for any thing, and yet not have it; or if he could will any thing, and yet not bring it to pass; he would and must, from that moment, cease to be perfectly happy, which is impossible."46 The consequence is plain: viz. that every thing falls out according to God's original design, or effective and permissive determination.
He powerfully beats down the Doctrine of human merit. He will not allow that men can merit at the hand of God, either antecedently, or subsequently, i.e. either prior to grace received, or after it. Is it not more bountiful to give than to barter? to bestow a thing freely, gratis, and for nothing; than for the sake of any preceding or subsequent desert, which would be a sort of price or payment? Even a generous man often confers benefits on others, without any view to the previous or succeeding merit of the object. Much more does God do this, who is infinitely richer in bounty than the most liberal of his creatures."47 From this, and a hundred other passages to the same effect, it is evident, that, where he applies the word meritum to any human act of obedience, he means no more by it, than moral goodness and virtue, as opposed to sin and vice: in which sense the term merit is incontestably used by several of the primitive fathers; though the word has been long and justly reprobated by all sound divines, on account of the antichristian use that is made of it by Papists and Pelagians.
From that declaration of our Lord, My Father worketh hitherto, and I work; and from that assertion of the apostle, in him we live, and are moved [kinoumeqa,] and exist; the archbishop infers, 1. That no thing whatever can put any other thing into motion unless God himself, by his own proper influence, give motion to the thing so moved: 2. That no thing whatever can put any other iuto motion, without God's being the immediate mover of it: Yea, 3. That whatsoever is put in motion by any thing else, is more immediately moved by God himself, than by the instrument which sets it in motion, be that instrument what it will."48 This is winding up matters to a very high standard. And yet, perhaps, the standard is no higher than Philosophy itself can justify. But my readers will observe, that I am neither dictating to them, nor so much as giving my own express opinion. My present business is, to quote Bradwardin, simply as his judgment stands. "God," says he, "maketh all things, and moveth all things. In every formation, and in every motion, there must be some unoriginal former and some immoveable mover; else the process would be endless."49 His meaning is, that unless we trace up all being, and all philosophic motion (whether active motion, or passive,) to God himself, we can find no first cause, wherein to rest: we can have no central point to stop at, but shall be lost amid the immense circumference of boundless, wild uncertainty.
What he delivers concerning the knowledge of God, is worthy of our uttnost attention. "It is certain, that God hath a knowledge of all things present, of all things past, and of all things to come: which knowledge is supremely actual, particular, distinct, and50 infallible.51 We may consider it as either simple, or approbative. His simple or absolute knowledge extends to every thing. His knowledge of approbation includes (over and above the former) the liking, the good pleasure, and complacency of will, which he graciously bears to same persons."52 This distinction of the divine knowledge into absolute and approbatory, is founded on clear scripture evidence. Of the first, see John xxi. 17. 2 Tim. ii. 19. Of the latter, John x. 14. 1 John iii. 20.
He employs a whole53 chapter in proving, Quod res scitae non sunt causae divinae scientiae: or, that "the things known are not the foundation of God's knowing them." This to some, may seem a question of unnecessary speculation: but, on a nearer view it must appear to be a point of the utmost importance, in which the perfection (and consequently, the very being) of God are deeply involved. A summary of Bradwardin's reasoning on this subject deserves to be laid before the reader. "Knowledge is a principal perfection in God. If, therefore, his knowledge is derived from the objects with which it is conversant, it would follow, that God is indebted, for part of his perfection, to some other source than himself: in which case, he must cease to he self-perfect. He would, moreover, cease to be all-sufficient of himself: for he would stand in need of created help, to render his knowledge complete. His omniscience would be forced to ask assistance from the very things it comprehends. And how could his essential glory be matchless and unrivalled, if any portion of it was suspended on assistance borrowed from without? Add to this, that if the things, which God knows, are themselves the producing cause of his knowing them; they must be antecedent to his knowledge, either in commencement of existence, or in order of nature. But they are not prior to his knowledge in either of these respects: for they are all created in time: whereas God and his knowledge are eternal. Besides, if the Deity received any degree of his intelligence from the beings he has made, he would cease to be a pure actor: he would be passive, in that reception. Whence it would also follow, that he must be susceptible of change. Nay, he would degenerate into a sort of inferiority to the things known, and (being dependent on them for his knowledge) would, so far, be considered as less noble than they. The divine understanding would, like ours, be, occasionally, in a state of suspense and fluctuation. God might rather be said to possess a power or capability of knowing, than knowledge itself. He would only stand disposed to know either this or that, indifferently, according as the event may turn: and would be actuated and determined by agency and casuality extraneous to himself. And thus he would neither be the highest nor the first."54 Swayed by such reasons as these, the archbishop concludes, that Averroes was right in affirming, that "the knowledge of God is a cause of the things known, and not vice versa. Human knowledge is founded on its respective objects; but all objects of the divine knowledge are founded on the divine knowledge itself."55 He adds:"God himself is the first and the last, the beginning and the end.56 But were the things which he knows the basis of his knowledge, it would follow, that his creatures contribute to improve their Maker's wisdom. And thus, foolish man, or even the meanest beast of the field, would be exalted into a necessary assistant, councellor, and teacher of the all-wise God. Well, therefore, may we say, with Austin, God knew all his creatures, both corporeal and incorporeal, not because they exist; but they therefore exist, because he knew them: for he was not ignorant of what he intended to create. Amidst all the innumerable revolutions of advancing and departing. ages, the knowledge of God is neither lessened not, improved. No incident can possibly arise which thou didst not expect and foresee, who knowest all things: and every created nature is what it is, in consequence of thy knowing it as such."57
We are not to suppose, that Bradwardin contended for what may be called the mere knowledge of God, nakedly and abstractedly considered. He asserted the infinity, the independency, and the efficacy of the divine knowledge as founded on, and resulting from the eternal sovereignty, and irresistibility, of the divine will. "The will of God," says he, "is universally efficacious and invincible, and necessitates as a cause. It cannot be impeded, much less can it be defeated and made void, by any means whatever."58 What follows is extremely conclusive: "If you allow, 1. That God is able to do a thing: and, 2. That he is willing to do a thing; then, 3. I affirm, that thing will not, cannot, go unaccomplished. God either does it now, or will certainly do it at the destined season. Otherwise, he must either lose his power, or change his mind. He is in want of nothing that is requisite to carry his purposes into execution. Whence that remark of the philosopher : He, that hath both will and power to do a thing, certainly doth that thing."59 Again: If the will of God could he frustrated and vanquished, its defeat would arise from the created wills, either of angels, or of men. But, could any created will whatever, whether angelic or human, counter-act and baffle the will of God; the will of the creature must be superior, [either] in strength, [or in wisdom,] to the will of the creator: which can by no means be allowed."60 The absolute immutability of God effectually secures the infallible accomplishment of his will: whence our great English Austin justly observes, that "both the divine knowledge, and the divine will, are altogether unchangeable: since, was either one or the other to undergo any alteration, a change must fall on God himself."61
Pursuant to these maxims, he affirms, that, "whatever things come to pass, they are brought to pass by the providence of God"62 Nor could he suppose, that the great and blessed God is, in point of wisdom, fore-cast, and attention, inferior even to a prudent master of a family, who takes care of every thing that belongs to him; and makes provision beforehand, according to the best of his knowledge and power; and leaves nothing unregulated in his house, but exactly appoints the due time and place for every thing."63
The sentiments of this learned writer, relative to the doctrine of fate, are too judicious and important, to be wholly passed over. "We must," says he, "beyond all doubt, admit, there is such a thing as a divine fate."64 By a divine fate, he means, the decree which God hath irrevocably pronounced, or spoken: for he seems to agree with those who derive the word Fatum, either a fando, or from fiat; i.e. from God's speaking or commanding things to be. Whence he adds: "Is it not written, that in the beginning of the creation, God said, Fiat lux, let there be light, and there was light? Is it not written again, He spake and it was done? Now, that divine fate is chiefly a branch of the divine will, which is the efficacious cause of things."65 This seems to have been the real sense, in which the doctrine of66 fate was maintained by those of the ancients who were truly wise and considerate. And, in this sense, fate is a Christian doctrine in the strictest import of the word Christian. Nay, set aside fate, in this meaning of it, and I cannot see how either natural or revealed religion can stand. St. Austin was of the very same mind. "All that connection," says he, "and that train of causes, whereby every thing is what it is, are by the stoics called fate: the whole of which fate they ascribe to the will and power of the supreme God, whom they most justly believe to fore-know all things, and to leave nothing unordained. But it is the will itself of the supreme God, which they are chiefly found to call by the name of fate; because the energy of his will is unconquerably extended through all things."67 Another passage of St. Austin's, quoted also by Bradwardin, is no less pertinent and judicious: "We are far from denying that train of causes wherein the will of God has the grand sway. We avoid, however, giving it the name of fate; that is to say, unless you derive the word from fando. For we cannot but acknowledge, that it is written in the Scriptures, God hath once spoken, and these two things have I heard, that power belongeth unto God; and that mercy is with thee, for thou wilt render to every man according to his works. Now, whereas it is here said, that God hath spoken once; the meaning is, that he hath spoken unchangeably and irreversibly: even its he foreknew all things that should come to pass, and the things which he himself would do. The kingdoms of men are absolutely appointed by Divine Providence. Which if any one is desirous, for that reason, to attribute to fate, meaning by that word, the will and po,ver of God, let him hold fast the sentiment, and only correct the phrase."68
Bradwardin observes, that fate may be distinguished into active and passive. "Active fate is no other than the declaratory decree, or pronounced determination, of the will of God, considered as the disposer of all things. Passive fate may be taken, as the term itself imports, for that subjective effect and inherent tendency, with which things themselves are imbued, in consequence and by virtue of the afore-said pronounced determination."69 He adds, from Aristotle and Isidore, that the fable of the Three Fates is not without its reality. Atropos denoted what is past; Lachesis future; Clotho present. But all the three names were only designed to shadow forth god himself as Plato strenuously affirms."70
The speculations of the celebrated Boethius71 as cited by Bradwardin, on the article: of Providence and Fate, are not unworthy of perusal. Though far from unexpectionable, they are subtle and ingenious. "Providence is but another name for the Divine Wisdom itself, which stands at the helm of all things, and by which all things are regulated. - On the other hand, fate is that inherent disposition in things themselves, by which Divine Providence concatenates all things in their proper successions and dependencies. Providence comprehends all things, together and at once, however those things may differ from each other, and however infinite their number may seem. But fate reduces each particular thing into actual order, by a proper distribution as to motion, pace, form, and season: insomuch that, this actual evolution of the series of causes (which evolution is temporary, or brought to pass in time,) may be termed Providence, if considered as united and gathered to a point in the divine view. This simple connected view of all futurities, which is a perfection essential to the uncreated mind, may also be called fate; if you consider that view as gradually opened and unfolded in the several successions of time; for, though fate and Providence are not strictly the same, yet the former is dependent on the latter. That series of causes and effects, which is ordered by fate, takes its rise from the simplicity of Providence. As some curious artificer first forms, in his own mind, a design or plan of the piece of workmanship he intends to make, and then begins to take the work itself in hand, carrying into execution, through a regular and successive progress, the idea which he had, before, simply and readily modeled: so God, by his providence, orders and settles, particularly and firmly, the things that are to be accomplished; and, by fate, manages, in all their multiplicity and temporary successions, the things so ordered and settled. Whether, therefore, fate be rendered actually operative by the ministry of those unembodied spirits who are the servants and executors of Divine Providence; or by the human mind; or by the whole concurrence of subservient nature; or by the motions of the celestial orbs; or by the power of the good angels; or by the manifold subtlety of daemons; whether the chain of fate be complicated by any or all of these; thus much is certainly evident, that God's providence is the pure, immoveable model, according to which, matters are conducted; and that fate is the moveable connection, and temporary train, or series, of those things which the Divine Providence hath appointed to be accomplished. And from hence it is, that all things, which are subjected to fate, are likewise subjected to Providence; for Providence is the supreme regulatress, to which fate itself acts in subserviency."72
Thus far Boethius. The reader, perhaps, will be inclinable, with me, to ask, what need of labouring the point so nicely? To what end, is the thread so finely spun? one thing, however, is plain: viz. that, by Providence, he understood God's eternal foresight; and, by fate, that temporary disposure of events, which we now call Providence.73 To the former, he might be induced by the literal import of the word providence. If I rightly remember, Cicero, somewhere, shews himself of the same mind, and assigns that very reason for it. It should also be noticed, that, according to Boethius's doctrine, the divine fore-knowledge is not a naked, idle speculation of what barely would come to pass; but is tantamount to an operative, effective determination of what certainly shall come to pass. For he supposes absolute fate itself to be no more than a subordinate adminstrator, whose business it is to see that all events exactly correspond to that active knowledge of them which God had from everlasting. He expresses this, very clearly, in another subsequent passage, quoted by Bradwardin, wherein he reciprocates the terms providence and fate: "this series of fate, or providence, tightly binds down the actions and circumstances of men, by an indissoluble concatenation of causes."74 To this Bradwardin himself heartily accedes, in a remarkable paragraph adopted from St. Austin: "Our wills have just so much ability, as God willed and foreknew they should have. Consequently, they cannot avoid being indued with whatever ability they possess; and what they are to do, they absolutely shall do: for, both their ability and their works were foreknown of God, whose foreknowledge cannot be deceived."75
What Bradwardin professedly delivers, concerning the subjection of our most voluntary actions to the decrees and providence of God; what he adds, concerning the co-incidence of permission, and design; with several other correlative points of religious metaphysics; I purposely omit: not for want of inclination but of room. I shall, therefore, for the present, conclude my extract from his testimony, with a short sample, or two, of what he hath advanced, concerning predestination itself, the powers of free-will, and the perseverance of the saints.
Predestination is the only ground on which the divine fore-knowledge and providence can stand. Abstracted from the will and purpose of God, neither persons, nor things, nor events, could have any certain futurition: consequently, they could not be certainly fore-knowable. And providence must regulate every punctilio of its dispensations, by the same preconstructed plan; or it would follow, that God is liable to unforeseen emergencies, and acts either ignorantly, or contrary to his own will. The great Bradwardin was so clearly and deeply convinced of this, that he defines predestination to be (what in reality it is) neither more nor less than "Aeterna praevolutio Dei, sive prae-ordinatio voluntatis divinae, circa futurum: God's eternal prevolition, or pre-determination of his will, respecting what shall come to pass."76 He treats the mysterious articles of election and reprobation in particular, with such force and compass of argument, united with such modesty and judgment, as may, alone, suffice to class him among the ablest reasoners that ever wrote.
On the subject of liberty and necessity, he acknowledges that there is such a thing77 as free-will in God's reasonable creatures: and, I believe, every Calvinist upon earth acknowledges the same. The point, in dispute between us and the Arminians, is, not concerning the existence of free-will; but concerning its powers. That man is naturally endued with a will, we never denied: and that man's will is naturally free to what is morally and spiritually evil, we always affirmed. The grand hinge, then, on which the debate turns, is, whether free-will be, or be not, a faculty of such sovereignty and power, as either to ratify, or to baffle, the saving grace of God, according to its [i.e. according to the will's] own independent pleasure and self-determination? I should imagine, that every man of sense, piety, and reflection, must, at once, determine this question in the negative. If some do not, who are nevertheless possessed of those qualifications, I can only stand amazed at the force of that prejudice, which can induce any reasonable and religious person to suppose that divine wisdom is frustrable, and the divine power defeatable, by creatures of yesterday, who are absolutely and constantly dependent on God for their very being (and, consequently, for the whole of their operations) from moment to moment.
Bradwardin believed, that the human will, however free in its actings, is not altogether exempt from necessity. He supposed, that what the understanding regards as good, the will must necessarily desire; and what the understanding represents as evil, the will must necessarily disapprove.78 A remark this, not spun from the subtleties of metaphysics; but founded in fact, and demonstrable from every man's own hourly experience. The will, therefore, is no other than the practical echo of the understanding: and is so far from being endued with a self-determining power, or with a freedom of indifference to this or that; that it closes in with the dictates of the intellect, as naturally, as necessarily, and as implicitly, as an eastern slave accommodates his obedience to the commands of the grand seignor. As the understanding is, thus, the directress of the will; so, ten thousand different circumstances concur to influence and direct the understanding: which latter is altogether as passive, in her reception of impression from without, as she is sometimes active in her subsequent contemplation and combination of them. It follows, that if the understanding (from which the will receives its bias,) be thus liable to passive, subjective necessity; the will itself, which is absolutely governed by a faculty so subject to necessitation, cannot possibly be possessed of that kind of freedom, which the Arminian scheme supposes her to be: since, if she was, the hand-maid would be above her mistress; and uncontrollable sovereignty would be the immediate offspring of constringent necessity. Hence Bradwardin observes, that the human will cannot so much as conquer a single temptation, even after God's regenerating power has passed upon the soul, sine alio Dei auxilio speciali,79 "without a fresh supply of God's particular assistance:" which particular assistance he defines to be, voluntas Dei invicta80 the supernatural influence, resulting from the unconquerable will of God: "armed with which, his tempted children get the better of every temptation; but destitute of which, every temptation gets the better of them."81
And, indeed was not this the case, "The number of the elect and predestinate would," as Bradwardin nervously argues, "depend more on man than upon God. Men, by antecedently and casually disposing their own wills to this or that, would leave God no more to do, than to regulate his after decrees in a subservient conformity to the prior determinations of his creatures, and in a way of subjection and subordination to their will and pleasure:"82 than which supposition, nothing can be more impious and irrational. Besides, as he presently adds, if free will was possessed of these enormous powers, "It would be vain and idle in a man to pray to God for victory over temptation, or to give him thanks for victory obtained."83 When free-willers kneel down to petition God for any spiritual blessing, what is such conduct, but a virtual renunciation of their own distinguishing tenet? And, on the footing of that tenet, what an unmeaning service is the ascription of praise!
Quesitum meritus sume superbiam.
Away with prayer. Away with thanksgiving. Neither the one, nor the other, has ally reasonable pretext to keep it in countenance, on the principles of Pelagius and Arminius. The whole lower creation cannot exhibit a more glaring example of human inconsistency, than a free-willer on his knees.
Bradwardin was not less clear on the important article of final perseverance. According to him, this crowning grace is the gift of God alone: "When David prayed thus for his devout subjects, O Lord God, preserve this will of their heart for ever, and grant that their inclination to thy fear may continue in them;84 what was this, but a prayer for their ultimate perseverance? and why did he ask it of God, if it is not the gift of God, but acquirable by every man's own powers?"85 To which the evangelical prelate adds: "As David besought God, for the perserverance of his own religious subjects; so also the Lord Christ, our mystic David, besought God the Father in behalf of his own people, saying, Holy Father, preserve in thy own name those whom thou hast given unto me."86 Quoting that passage, Jer. xxxii. 37-40. he thus descants: "Hence it is evident, that both a departure from evil, and a final continuance in good to the end of our days, by virtue of that everlasting covenant which secures us against revolting from the Lord, which is what we mean by the phrase of perseverance to the end; neither takes it rise from, nor is carried on by, man; but from and by God himself. For which reason, St. Austin, in his Treatise concerning the Blessing of Perseverance, observes, that, in the above passage of scripture, God promises perseverance to his people, saying, I will put my fear into their hearts, that they shall not depart from me. What is this (saith Austin), but to affirm, The fear which I will put into their hearts, shall be such, and so great, that they shall perseveringly adhere to me?"87
It is now time for me to take my unwilling leave of Bradwardin, and put an end to this long Section, by just dropping a word,
V. Concerning that illustrious nobleman and martyr, Sir John Oldcastle, the good lord Cobham. No one, who is at all acquainted with English History, need be informed, that this great and excellent person fell a sacrifice, in reality, to the rage of the Romish ecclesiastics; whose hatred he had incurred by the purity of his religious principles, and by the honest boldness with which he asserted them. King Henry V. notwithstanding his political maxim, of keeping fair with the Church, at all events, would, probably, never have gratified her with a victim of such high rank, and for whom he had a great personal regard, if some churchmen of that age had not trumped up a charge of treason against lord Cobham: when all the while, his real crime, in their eye, was, heresy. The Princes of the House of Lancaster could not but be perfectly conscious that their possession of the throne was founded on manifest usurpation. This rendered them extremely suspicious of their subjects; and induced them to avenge, with severity, every measure that seemed to threaten the smallest approaches of a revolution. The Papists availed themselves of this circumstance, in the case of lord Cobham. The King, though displeased at this nobleman's abhorrence of Popery, was not, perhaps, sorry to hear of his escape from the Tower: as that incident extricated his Majesty from the painful alternative of either offending the Church, by pardoning Cobham in form; or of resigning a victorious general and faithful subject to the flames, in order to satisfy a set of men who were, in reality, but so many dead weights on the wheel of civil government. But the ecclesiastics would not quit their prey so easily. Some time after lord Cobham's escape from the Tower, about 100 Wickliffites (or, as they were then called, Lollards) were assembled, for the purposes of devotion, in St. Giles's Fields, at that time, an uncultivated tract of ground, overgrown with bushes and trees.88 The good people were then obliged by persecution either entirely to forego all religious meetings, or to hold them in such sequestered places as those.
This innocent assembly was not conducted with the intended secrecy. The Papists gained intelligence of it, and alarmed the King (who was keeping Christmas at Eltham) with information, that a number of Lollards, to the amount of at least 20,000, with lord Cobham at their head, were rendezvoused in St. Giles's Fields, with a view to exterminate the reigning family. The jealous King gave implicit credit to the false representation: and, repairing, at midnight, to the place, with such forces as he could hastily collect found about 80 persons met together. Some were immediately slaughtered by the soldiers. About 60 were taken prisoners; of whom, 34 were afterwards hanged, and seven hanged and burned.
I mention this pretended conspiracy, because it sealed the doom of lord Cobham. Though he was not so much as present at the above meeting, "A Bill of Attainder passed against him, a reward of a thousand marks was set on his head, and a perpetual exemption from taxes promised to any town that should secure him."89 After a concealment of nigh four years, the attained Peer was apprehended in Montgomeryshire, and conveyed to London; where be received sentence of death. He was executed in St. Giles's Fields, on Christmas day, December 25, 1417. Nothing could be more cruel than the mode of his sufferings. All historians agree, that he was burned hanging. Echard says, that he was suspended over the fire, by an iron chain, fastened round his middle.90 The plate, in Mr. Fox, represents him as hanging with his back downward, by three chains: the first fastened to his middle, by an iron hoop; the second, to his right thigh; the other to his neck.91
We have very little remaining of what was written by the noble martyr. His two confessions of faith, which occur in Fox, were evidently so worded, as to give no more offence to the times, than was absolutely necessary: a precaution, which, however, did not save the life of their author. I therefore rest the evidence of his probable Calvinism, on the known Calvinism of Wickliff. I have already proved, that Wickliff carried the doctrines of predestination and grace to a very great length: nor is it likely, that Lord Cobham should have been so devoted an admirer of Wickliff, as he certainly was; nor have put himself to the labour, expense, and danger, of transcribing and dispersing the writings of that reformer, with such zeal and industry as he certainly did; had he differed from Wickliff on points which so materially affect the whole system of Protestantism. A very judicious writer affirms that lord Cobham "caused all the works of Wickliff to be wrote out and dispersed in Bohemia, France, Spain, Portugal, and other parts of Europe."92 Which, I should imagine, he would no more have done, had he not adopted Wickliff's plan of doctrine, than the vicar of Broad Hembury would be at the pains and cost of re-printing and dispersing the lucubrations of Mr. John Wesley.
Indeed, the principles of all Wickliff's disciples appear, so far as I have been able to find, highly Calvinistical. Take one specimen in lieu of many.
About the year 1391, during the reign of Richard II. a letter of expostulation, written, by a Lollard, to one Nicholas Hereford (who had apostatized from Wickliffism to popery,) has the two following paragraphs: "No perversion of any reprobate," says the pious expostulator, "is able to turn the congregation of the elect from the faith: because all things that shall come to pass, are eternally, in God, devised and ordained for the best unto the elect Christians. Like as the mystical body of Christ is the congregation of all the elect; so Antichrist, mystically, is the Church of the wicked and of all the reprobates."93 So true is it, that the doctrine of absolute predestination was held and maintained by the very first Protestants, long before the actual establishment of that doctrine at the Reformation.
Endnotes: